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THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND 
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS: ADVANTAGES OF A 
“METHODS” APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL 
Benjamin Kastan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Breathing through chemical smoke has been described as “drowning 
on dry land.”1 When one imagines chemical weapons, one often imagines 
that indelible image of Doughboys choking in trenches through a fog of 
yellow mustard gas. Though World War I did not see the first use of 
chemical weapons, it did produce the first large-scale industrialized 
chemical warfare. The effects of this kind of warfare live on in the 
conventions and taboos associated with chemical weapons. In 1993, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical 
Weapons Convention, or CWC) was signed and later ratified by the U.S. 
and 187 other states.2 The history of the legal regime surrounding chemical 
weapons (CW) reflects the long-term trend of banning weapons systems 
and technologies that are considered inhumane or undesirable. However, 
these legal regimes often have difficulty keeping up with the pace of 
technology and sometimes restrict the use of potentially more humanitarian 
weapons systems. One such example is the development of non-lethal 
weapons (NLW).3 The CWC provides some leeway in this regard by 
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 1.  Jacques Forster, Vice-President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Statement at the International 
Seminar on the Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat: Preventing the Use of Biological and 
Chemical Weapons (Oct. 6, 2005).  
 2.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-219, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter CWC]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 334-35 (2011), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/169274.pdf. 
 3.  The term “non-lethal weapons” has proven extremely controversial as it is not an accurate 
description of the technologies and weapons that fall within the category. Even advocates of NLW do 
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allowing for the use of one type of non-lethal chemical weapons, Riot 
Control Agents (RCAs), in law enforcement. 
The debate over RCAs mirrors in large part the debate over weapons 
conventions generally. Some military officials have advocated getting rid 
of weapons conventions in favor of internal reviews.4 The most prominent 
example of this view can be found in the writing of General John 
Alexander, former Commander of the Joint Non-lethal Weapons 
Directorate (JNLWD). He argues that these conventions are fundamentally 
flawed because they focus on the technology rather than undesired results.5 
Advocates of the weapons conventions counter that so-called NLW are not 
so non-lethal.6 They further contend that non-lethal chemical weapons, 
including RCAs, are dangerous to use on the battlefield because they are 
“threshold weapon[s],” which may lead to faster escalation to more lethal 
chemical weapons.7 
This note will analyze how the CWC affects how the U.S. may use 
RCAs in a war zone and compares the result to that from a more basic 
review guided by the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)––a 
review grounded in the methods, rather than the means of warfare. I apply 
these rules to hypotheticals drawn from real world examples, and argue that 
the most significant differences between the means-based CWC approach 
and the methods-based LOAC approach are in the weapons available for 
use against combatants, not the impact on civilians. Nevertheless, I do not 
advocate withdrawal of the U.S. from the CWC regime because history 
suggests that using chemical NLW on the battlefield may make war no 
more humane than before. However, the example of RCAs within the 
means-based CWC regime demonstrates the limitations and the unintended 
consequences of an arms control regime focused on the “means” of 
warfare. A more basic LOAC approach that focuses on the methods of 
warfare, rather than the means, may better balance the humanitarian 
 
not claim they are fully non-lethal, but simply less lethal. This note will use the Department of 
Defense’s intent-based definition of NLW as “a weapon that is explicitly designed and primarily 
employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to 
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment.” U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Nonlethal 
Weapon, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY TERMS, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data 
/n/11245.html (last visited May 6, 2011). 
 4.  See generally John B. Alexander, Optional Lethality, 23 HARV. INT’L REV., no. 2, 2001, at 
64, available at http://hir.harvard.edu/the-future-of-war/optional-lethality. 
 5.  JOHN B. ALEXANDER, FUTURE WAR 198-99 (1999). 
 6.  NEIL DAVISON, ‘NON-LETHAL’ WEAPONS 3 (2009) (highlighting the intent rather than effect-
based definition of non-lethal). 
 7.  See generally Kyle M. Ballard, Convention in Peril? Riot Control Agents and the Chemical 
Weapons Ban, ARMS CONTROL TODAY Sept. 2007, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/ 
act/2007_09/RiotFeature. 
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interests than flat weapons bans. Thus, I conclude that the U.S. should 
consider pursuing (1) new treaties to focus and elaborate on the rules 
governing methods of warfare rather than the means and (2) stronger 
internal reviews of new weapons systems around the world. By using 
widely-accepted standards, the international humanitarian system may 
prove better able to adapt to ever-changing technological realities. 
I. THE HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND RCAS 
Chemical weapons have, for at least the last century, been viewed as a 
dishonorable and offensive kind of weapon.8 However, chemical weapons 
of some sort have been part of warfare as far back as Thucydides, when 
“the Peloponnesians . . . tried to reduce the town of Plataea with sulphur 
fumes in the fifth century BC.”9 The first international agreement aimed at 
restricting their use took place at the Hague Conference of 1899, where 
certain attendees agreed “to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole 
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gas.”10 The 
two most significant military powers to refuse the above provision were the 
U.S. and the U.K. By the outbreak of World War I, a more universal taboo 
against the use of chemical weapons began to take hold. In the Great War, 
German forces “handed the allies a propaganda coup” by being the first to 
use lethal chemical munitions.11 This first-to-act status enabled their 
adversaries to blame Germany for “the initiation of ‘frightfulness’ (as gas 
warfare was dubbed).”12 It is important to note that some of the chemical 
weapons used in WWI were RCAs, including, “[l]achrymators (tear-
producing agents) like . . . chloroacetophenone (CN), along with vomiting 
agents.”13 Initially, CN gas was developed for domestic law enforcement 
use in France.14 In fact, the first chemical munition brought to the front was 
a canister of CN gas carried by a French policeman.15 
The inter-war period saw a proliferation of international institutions 
and conventions. Among these newly founded agreements was the 
 
 8.  BARRY R. SCHNEIDER, FUTURE WAR AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION: U.S. MILITARY 
RESPONSES TO NBC PROLIFERATION THREATS 84 (1999). 
 9.  EDWARD M. SPIERS, A HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 28 (2010); 
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 172 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972). 
 10.  Id. at 29. 
 11.  Id. at 31. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Kip Lindberg, The Use of Riot Control Agents During the Vietnam War, ARMY CHEMICAL 
REV., Jan.-June 2007, at 51.  
 14.  DAVISON, supra note 6, at 16. 
 15.  James D. Fry, Gas Smells Awful: U.N. Forces, Riot-Control Agents and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 475, 481 (2010). 
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Washington Treaty, championed by the U.S. The Washington Treaty 
established that “[t]he use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is prohibited.16 This 
agreement is notable in that it did not prohibit the stockpiling or 
development of chemical weapons––simply their use. Additionally, the 
U.S. did not consider RCAs “chemical weapons.”17 The language of the 
Washington Treaty was reproduced in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which the 
U.S. signed, though did not actually ratify until 1975.18 
During World War II, none of the belligerents used chemical 
weapons, though all maintained capabilities in the area.19 The reasons for 
the non-use of chemical weapons varied, but in part it was based on the fear 
of alienating neutral parties, fear of retaliation in kind, and the limited 
utility of chemical weapons in a fast-moving war.20 
The next major use of chemical weapons came in Vietnam, where the 
U.S. used chemical defoliants to destroy ambush-friendly jungles21 and riot 
control agents, including ortho-chlorobenzylidene-malononitrile (CS), to 
force enemy combatants out of hiding in order to facilitate lethal 
targeting.22 The use of such chemicals in Vietnam stirred outrage in much 
of the international community and within the U.S.23 In response, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1969 passed Resolution 2603A, 
“which purportedly gave its definitive interpretation of the [Geneva] 
Protocol to include tear gas.”24 However, the status of tear gas, RCAs, and 
other chemical agents remained unresolved. 
II. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND RCAS 
States party to the 1993 CWC have agreed “never under any 
circumstances” to develop, use, prepare its military to use chemical 
weapons, or to assist anyone in doing so.25 The Convention defines 
 
 16.  Edward Spiers, Gas Disarmament in the 1920s: Hopes Confounded, 29 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 
281, 289 (2006) (quoting 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 269 (1992)). 
 17.  Lindberg, supra note 13, at 51. 
 18.  SPIERS, supra note 9, at 51; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 
94 L.N.T.S. 65. 
 19.  See SPIERS, supra note 9, at 59.  
 20.  Id. at 58-60.  
 21.  Lloyd G. Miller, The Use of Chemicals in Stability Operations, MIL. REV., Dec. 1966, at 43, 
46. 
 22.  Lindberg, supra note 13, at 52. 
 23.  Miller, supra note 21, at 46. 
 24.  Fry, supra note 15, at 484. 
 25.  CWC, supra note 2, art. 1(1). 
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chemical weapons inter alia as “(a) [t]oxic chemicals and their precursors, 
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, 
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.”26 
Separately, the CWC defines those purposes not prohibited under the 
Convention as peaceful research, protective purposes, military purposes 
“not connected with the use of chemical weapons,” (such as using weed-
killing chemicals on military bases) and “(d) [l]aw enforcement including 
domestic riot control purposes.”27 It further defines toxic chemical as 
“[a]ny chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or 
animals.”28 Parties to the CWC also agree to not use RCAs “as a method of 
warfare.”29 The CWC defines Riot Control Agents as “any chemical not 
listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory 
irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time 
following termination of exposure.”30 Thus, the CWC exempts RCAs and 
other law enforcement related toxic chemicals from the definition of 
chemical weapon, but prohibits the use of RCAs as a method of warfare. 
The text of the CWC leaves a great deal of ambiguity on a number of 
important questions. For instance, the CWC declares that chemicals 
intended for purposes not prohibited, such as law enforcement, are not 
chemical weapons.31 However, the CWC does not specify whether the 
relevant intent concerns the design or use of the chemicals. If a toxic 
chemical is designed and intended for use in law enforcement but used in a 
non-law enforcement manner, would the CWC prohibit such use?32 
Additionally, defining “law enforcement” and “method of warfare” 
has proven exceedingly difficult. These two terms are “important concepts 
 
 26.  Id. art. 2(1)(a). 
 27.  Id. art. 2(9). 
 28.  Id. art. 2(2) (emphasis added). 
 29.  Id. art. 1(5). 
 30.  Id. art. 2(7). 
 31.  See id. art. 2(1)(a).  
 32.  This ambiguity may be limited some by the requirement that toxic chemicals exempted under 
this “purposes not prohibited” section also be of a type and quantity consistent with their asserted non-
prohibited purposes. See id. Presumably, if a certain toxic chemical intended for law enforcement use 
were used, for instance, as a “method of warfare,” such use would require the offending party to 
stockpile the chemicals in such a way as to violate the consistent type and quantity provision. 
Additionally, using a toxic chemical as a method of warfare, even if not strictly prohibited by the text, 
should be seen as forbidden. One must interpret treaties consistent with their object and purpose and not 
act contrary to that purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31(1), 18, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the Vienna Convention has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate, it is 
considered to be an accurate codification of customary international law. See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. 
Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000).  
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[that] were left undefined by the negotiators [of the CWC].”33 It seems 
clear from the negotiating history of the treaty that these terms were 
deliberately left undefined in order to achieve a more widespread 
acceptance of the Convention, in particular by the U.S.34 Several questions 
have been raised regarding the scope of “law enforcement activities.” Some 
have included peacekeeping and humanitarian missions as “law 
enforcement,” while others claim that such use would be a violation of the 
CWC.35 
Counter-terrorism operations cause particular difficulties for the “law 
enforcement” term. For instance, in 2002 Chechen terrorists took control of 
the Dubrovka Theatre Center in Moscow, taking 800 hostages.36 The 
terrorists wired the theatre to explode and strapped suicide vests to 
themselves.37 After a three day standoff and after one hostage had been 
executed, Russian special forces (Spetsnaz) raided the theatre.38 However, 
before breaching they filled the theatre with an aerosolized chemical 
incapacitant.39 In the ensuing raid, 125 hostages died (all by complications 
from the chemical agent), scores more were injured and all the terrorists 
were killed. Almost all of the terrorists had been incapacitated by the 
chemical agent, but when the Spetsnaz entered the theatre they shot those 
who had not been affected and “peremptorily executed” those terrorists 
who had been knocked unconscious.40 The vexing question this situation 
posed to the CWC regime was whether this raid was “law enforcement” or 
a military operation. Military forces were used in the raid against those 
currently engaging in what the Russian Constitutional Court has called an 
armed conflict with the Russian Federation.41 Nevertheless, many writers 
have opined that the use of a chemical agent in this raid was consistent with 
 
 33.  MICHAEL CROWLEY, DANGEROUS AMBIGUITIES: REGULATION OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS 
AND INCAPACITANTS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 10 (October 2009), available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/publications/BNLWRPDangerous1.pdf. 
 34.  Ernest Harper, A Call for a Definition of Method of Warfare in Relation to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 136-37 (2001).  
 35.  Fry, supra note 15, at 506. 
 36.  David A. Koplow, Tangled Up in Khaki and Blue: Lethal and Non-lethal Weapons in Recent 
Confrontations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 703, 770-71 (2005). 
 37.  Id. at 771. 
 38.  Id. at 771-72. 
 39.  David P. Fidler, Incapacitating Chemical and Biochemical Weapons and Law Enforcement 
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, in INCAPACITATING BIOCHEMICAL WEAPONS 175 (Alan 
Pearson et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Fidler, Incapacitating CBW]. 
 40.  Koplow, supra note 36, at 772. 
 41.  Paola Gaeta, The Armed Conflict in Chechnya Before the Russian Constitutional Court, 7 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 563, 568 (1996). 
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the CWC.42 Would this analysis be the same had it occurred in Chechnya 
itself as other military operations were ongoing in the region? The question 
would be much less likely to yield a majority opinion than the Dubrovka 
raid did.43 
Another ambiguous phrase is “method of warfare.” The “method of 
warfare” restriction is meant to prevent confusion on the battlefield which 
may lead to the escalation from RCA to lethal CW.44 Many international 
treaties concerning the LOAC use the term “method of warfare.” Most such 
treaties, however, refer to “methods or means of warfare.”45 The omission 
of “means of warfare” from the CWC has led to wrangling about the 
difference between “means” and “methods” of warfare.46 There is no 
“widely accepted, or even readily identifiable, definition [of either term] in 
all of international law.”47 Nevertheless, in common usage, “means” 
generally refers to the tools of war, i.e. weapons, while “methods” refers to 
the manner in which those weapons are used.48 Omission of the term 
“means” may signify that there are cases where use of RCA would be 
lawful in war. If the drafters of the treaty meant to ban every use of RCA in 
a war zone then it would have been better to include or only use the phrase 
“means of warfare.” However, as in the case of “law enforcement,” “[t]his 
ambiguity is precisely what led to the inclusion of the term method of 
warfare in the language of the Convention.”49 Nevertheless, there have 
been calls both from the arms control community and from military 
lawyers for greater clarity in this area.50 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Fidler, Incapacitating CBW, supra note 39, at 174. 
 43.  See, e.g., CROWLEY, supra note 33, at 34; see also Ballard, supra note 7 (“The definition of 
law enforcement should mean domestic law enforcement within the recognized, sovereign borders of a 
country and activities undertaken in conjunction with a UN mandate.”). 
 44.  Harper, supra note 34, at 151-52. 
 45.  See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 35, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter AP I]. Though the U.S. is not a party to AP I, it does follow some 
provisions as a matter of policy and considers other provisions reflective of customary international 
law. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL L. DEP’T THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, U.S. 
ARMY, Law of War, in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 9, 11, n.6 (2010) [hereinafter OPLAW 
HANDBOOK]. 
 46.  See, e.g., Harper, supra note 34, at 154. 
 47.  Id. at 133. 
 48.  See, e.g., Kathleen Lawand, Reviewing the Legality of New Weapons, Means and Methods of 
Warfare, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 925, 927 (2006).  
 49.  Harper, supra note 34, at 133. 
 50.  Id. at 159. 
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III. THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF THE CWC 
The U.S. interpretations of the CWC, especially the provisions 
regarding method of warfare and law enforcement, are generally at odds 
with those of the rest of the States Parties to the CWC, even close allies 
like the United Kingdom. Geoff Hoom, then-U.K. Defense Secretary, said 
in 2003 that non-lethal chemical weapons “would not be used by the 
United Kingdom in any military operations or on any battlefield.”51 The 
U.S., on the other hand, has a more moderate interpretation of chemical 
weapons. Since nearly the beginning of efforts to control chemical 
weapons, the U.S. has announced that it does not consider RCAs to be 
chemical weapons.52 This interpretation was first codified in Executive 
Order 11850 and emphasized by the U.S. Senate in its advice and 
consent.53 The main objection to this interpretation concerns the threat of 
escalation from RCAs to other chemical agents. Critics point out that 
before more lethal agents were used in WWI, the Iran-Iraq war, and other 
chemical conflicts, RCAs were deployed.54 Defenders of the U.S. position 
would respond that it is quite simple to tell the difference between RCAs 
and more toxic chemical agents. Additionally, the Executive Order restricts 
the use of RCAs to defensive modes where escalation would be least likely. 
A. Executive Order 11850 
Executive Order 11850 [EO 11850] was first issued by President Ford 
in 1975. It was considered “a compromise policy . . . [that maintained the] 
military’s ability to use RCA’s.”55 EO 11850 outlines four acceptable uses 
of RCAs: 
 
(a) Use of riot control agents in areas under direct and distinct U.S 
military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. 
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to 
mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. 
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated 
areas of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners. 
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of 
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists 
 
 51.  CROWLEY, supra note 33, at 28 (internal quotation marks removed). 
 52.  Harper, supra note 34, at 134. 
 53.  See Exec. Order No. 11,850, 40 Fed. Reg. 16,187 (Apr. 8, 1975) [hereinafter EO 11,850]; 143 
CONG. REC. S3657 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997). 
 54.  Fry, supra note 15, at 540 (“‘[E]very confirmed resort to lethal chemical warfare has started 
with tear gas.’”) (quoting “Non-Lethal” Weapons, the CWC and the BWC, 61 CBW CONVENTIONS 
BULL., Sept. 2003, at 2).  
 55.  Harper, supra note 34, at 135-36. 
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and paramilitary organizations.56 
 
Further, before using RCAs in war, such use must be approved by the 
President.57 Thus, RCAs are in the rather unique position of being a 
weapon system whose use is so restricted that it must be approved by the 
President prior to its use on the battlefield. Most other weapons systems, by 
contrast, must simply be approved ex ante by a competent legal reviewer.58 
Nevertheless, some prominent commentators have argued that sections (b) 
and (c) of EO 11850 are inconsistent with the CWC.59 
B. Understandings of the CWC 
The CWC was a contentious treaty when President Clinton brought it 
to the Senate for ratification. As part of the compromise which facilitated 
ratification, the Senate included an interpretation of the CWC as applied to 
Riot Control Agents in its advice and consent resolution.60 The Senate 
resolved that “the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its 
use of riot control agents, including use against combatants who are parties 
to a conflict” in three cases: (1) where the U.S. is not a party to the conflict, 
(2) consensual Chapter VI peacekeeping operations and (3) Chapter VII 
peacekeeping operations.”61 Additionally, the Senate imposed a condition 
that “[t]he President shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule or 
regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 
8, 1975.”62 
IV. CURRENT APPROACH TO REGULATING THE MEANS AND 
METHODS OF WARFARE 
There are three principal sources of LOAC as it concerns means and 
methods63 of warfare: (1) means-specific treaties like the CWC, (2) treaty 
 
 56.  EO 11,850, supra note 53.  
 57.  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-11.11, FLAME, RIOT CONTROL AGENT, AND 
HERBICIDE OPERATIONS 1-2 (March 2003) (“Only the President may authorize the following: •Use of 
RCAs in war, including defensive military modes.”). 
 58.  INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT., THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL LEGAL CENTER AND 
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 142 (Brian Bill ed., 2010) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR 
DESKBOOK], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOW-Deskbook-2010.pdf. 
 59.  Fidler, Incapacitating CBW, supra note 39, at 182; Nicholas Wade & Eric Schmitt, A Nation 
at War: Weapons; Use of Tear Gas Could Violate Treaty, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2003, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950CE4D61438F936A35757C0A9659C8B63.  
 60.  143 CONG. REC. S3657 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1997). 
 61.  Id. § 26(A). 
 62.  Id. § 26(B). 
 63.  There is no widely accepted definition of either “means” or “methods” of warfare. Harper, 
supra note 34, at 133 This note, however, will follow the International Committee of the Red Cross’ 
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rules governing the methods of warfare and (3) Martens Clause material—
customary law and general principles of international law. 
Like the CWC, other arms control treaties forbid the use of certain 
means of warfare. For instance, the Biological Weapons Convention 
prohibits the use of “[m]icrobial or other biological agents, or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.”64 Another line of treaties bans certain kinds of “conventional 
weapons.” For instance, the UN Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons has several protocols, each dealing with a different means of 
warfare, such as blinding lasers.65 Some of the oldest weapons bans 
concern conventional weapons. The 1899 Hague Declaration banned the 
use of expanding or “dum-dum” bullets.66 The reasons for the bans varied, 
but all were generally justified on humanitarian grounds.67 
The second method of regulating warfare is the control of the methods 
of warfare combatants can employ. The Geneva Conventions, for instance, 
prohibit attacks on protected targets.68 Commanders must take into account 
whether a given attack on a military target will result in disproportionate 
injury to civilian lives and property.69 These prohibitions and analytical 
methods are then turned into fact-specific regulations for combatants 
through the rules of engagement.70 The rules of engagement take into 
account legal constraints, the policy objectives of the mission, and the 
overall strategic interests of the campaign.71 They inform the combatant 
 
usage of those terms.  See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW 
WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE 11, (2006), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0902.htm [hereinafter GUIDE TO LEGAL 
REVIEW] (describing means of warfare as weapons, while methods of warfare as how the means are 
used). Thus, the “means” of warfare will include weapons systems and platforms (e.g., an M1A1 
Abrams tank or RCA canister). “Methods,” by contrast, means the ways in which those weapons are 
used at the tactical level. In this case, the means would be non-lethal chemical weapons (NLCW) and 
the method would be the use of NLCW against a given target (e.g. enemy combatants hiding in a cave).  
 64.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction art. 1(1), Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter BWC]. 
 65.  See, e.g., Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Additional Protocol IV to the UN Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to 
Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980), 13 Oct. 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370 
[hereinafter AP IV to the CCW]. 
 66.  OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 17. 
 67.  See, e.g., BWC, supra note 64, Preamble ¶ 10.  
 68.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV].  
 69.  OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 20. 
 70.  Id. at 73. 
 71.  Id. at 73-74. 
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about when he can employ the means of warfare at his disposal and against 
whom.72 
There is a wide swath of warfare which is covered by no positive 
international law. Where there is no positive international law, nations 
should look to customary international law (CIL) and general principles of 
international law for guidance.73 This idea comes in part from the Martens 
Clause of the 1899 Hague Convention, which was then reproduced in 
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.74 The contours of 
what this clause means, however, are subject to a vigorous debate.75 Some 
believe that the Martens Clause is merely a reminder that non-positive 
international legal norms exist.76 Others contend that it “has a normative 
status in its own right and therefore works independently of other norms.”77 
To some extent the clause reflects the natural law origins of much of the 
LOAC principles.78 
After the rapid codification of LOAC, the basic principles can be 
gathered from the various international treaties and relevant state practice. 
Though these principles are reflected in treaty law, they are also generally 
considered CIL and thus are binding even on states not party to the relevant 
conventions. These principles are: the principle of discrimination,79 the 
principle of proportionality,80 and the principle of humanity.81 
 
 72.  Id. at 73. 
 73.  See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
paras. 74, 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion]. 
 74.  Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS, Apr. 30, 1997, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnhy.htm (last 
visited May 6, 2011); AP I, supra note 45, art. 1(2).  
 75.  See Emily Crawford, The Modern Relevance of the Martens Clause, 6 ISIL Y.B. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE L. 1, 2, 7 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810177 (last 
visited May 8, 2011). 
 76.  Id. at 18. 
 77.  Ticehurst, supra note 74. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; GC 
IV, supra note 68; AP I, supra note 45, art. 51(4). 
 80.  AP I, supra note 45, art. 51; see generally Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-
A, Judgment and Opinion (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
 81.  Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague IV]; AP I, supra note 45, art. 35(2).  
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A. Discrimination and Proportionality 
The basic principle of discrimination is that combatants must 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and refrain from 
attacking civilians or civilian objects.82 Additionally, in any attack on 
combatants, the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian 
property incidental to attacks must be proportionate to the concrete and 
direct military advantage expected to be gained.83 It can be difficult to 
apply both of these principles in the context of non-lethal weapons. 
Traditionally, attack meant lethal attack.84 However, many argue that “the 
term ‘attack’ logically includes all acts that cause violent consequences, 
i.e., death or injury to civilians (including significant human physical or 
mental suffering) or damage to, or destruction of, tangible civilian 
objects.”85 
Non-lethal weapons, including riot control agents, may cause death or 
serious injury among a percentage of the targeted group. Even Oleoresin 
Capsicum (OC), pepper spray, “can cause respiratory failure in susceptible 
individuals.”86 RCAs like chlorobenzylidene-malononitrile (CS) and 
chloroacetophenone (CN) “have a lethality rate of approximately 0.5 %.”87 
For comparison, the lethality rates for military-grade individual firearms is 
approximately 35%, and that of artillery, approximately 20%.88 Because 
RCAs are not fully non-lethal, some have concluded that “the use of an 
indiscriminate ‘non-lethal’ weapon just because civilians are incapacitated 
but not killed would eat at the heart of the [International Humanitarian 
Law] protections for civilians.”89 In an armed conflict, a civilian or other 
non-combatant may only be targeted, even by a non-lethal weapon, if it is 
 
 82.  GC IV, supra note 68, Art. 27; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 
13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513.  
 83.  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 157 (2005). 
 84.  Richard Taylor, The Capture Versus Kill Debate: Is the Principle of Humanity Now Part of 
the Targeting Analysis when Attacking Civilians who Are Directly Participating in Hostilities, 2010 
ARMY LAW 103, 109 (“Numerous scholars agree that the plain meaning of attack is the application of 
lethal force against an enemy.”).  
 85.  Michael Schmidt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 291 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006). 
 86.  M.C. JORDAN, LEGAL REVIEW OF OLEORESIN CAPSICUM (OC) PEPPER SPRAY, REPORT TO 
THE COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND 5 (1998), available at http://www.sunshine-
project.org/incapacitants/jnlwdpdf/jagocrev.pdf.  
 87.  Fry, supra note 15, at 538. 
 88.  Id. at 537-38; see also David P. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” 
Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51, 56 (1999) [hereinafter Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons]. 
 89.  Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 88, at 84. 
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necessary in response to a hostile act and proportional to the threat.90 By 
contrast, absent the CWC and the Geneva Gas Protocol, there would be 
nothing in LOAC which would prohibit the use of RCAs against 
combatants, so long as harm to civilians was proportionate. 
B. Humanity – Avoiding Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering 
Traditionally, this principle prohibited the use of weapons such as 
dum-dum bullets, which were deemed to cause injury disproportionate to 
its military effectiveness.91 The ICRC has suggested that one determines 
which weapons cause such injury or suffering by analyzing “design-
dependent, foreseeable effects of weapons when they are used against 
human beings.”92 RCAs usually cause no permanent injury and have an 
extremely low lethality rate.93 Comparing such a low injury and death rate 
to potentially great military advantage would weigh heavily in their favor. 
Therefore, they would pass the per se superfluous injury inquiry. 
Unnecessary suffering is generally considered to be the “balancing of 
the military necessity in employing a weapon and the likely suffering 
occasion by that employment.”94 This analysis would be much more fact-
specific. Generally, one must compare “other existing technologies and 
comparable wounding mechanisms” to determine whether the suffering is 
necessary or unnecessary.95 Thus, there must be an ongoing and fact-
specific process of legal review.96 
V. APPLICATION OF THE CWC AND THE LOAC GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES 
In this section, I will apply the law from the CWC, including its 
ambiguities, to three hypotheticals, loosely based on real situations––one in 
Iraq and two in Afghanistan. Then, I will apply the LOAC general 
principles to the same situations and compare the results from the two 
modes of analysis. 
 
 90.  JORDAN, supra note 86, at 6.  
 91.  LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 58, at 142. 
 92.  Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 88, at 87. 
 93.  U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 8-9, NATO HANDBOOK ON THE MEDICAL 
ASPECTS OF NBC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS § 701 (1996). 
 94. JORDAN, supra note 86, at 6-7. 
 95.  Id. at 7. 
 96.  See id. at 6.  
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A. Iraq 
1. Human Shields in Basra during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq97 
A large unit of the fedayeen have taken refuge in Basra. They have 
placed tanks near schools and positioned their command and control in 
hospitals, surrounding themselves with civilians. The civilians are 
unwilling human shields, but cannot escape the city. Many civilians and 
friendly forces will die if coalition forces attempt to take the city. The 
fedayeen refuse to surrender and will continue using human shields if the 
Coalition forces attempt to take the city. Could the Coalition employ RCAs 
to separate the combatants and non-combatants? 
 a. CWC 
Under the non-U.S. interpretation of the CWC, the answer is a 
straightforward “no.” As mentioned above, U.K. forces, for instance, would 
not be allowed to use RCAs in this circumstance. U.S. forces, however, 
may be able to under EO 11850(b), as this is a case where arguably 
civilians are being used to screen the fedayeen force. Normally, 
“screening” an attack means to use another force (in this case civilians) to 
protect the advance of the main force in question.98 Most likely, the use of 
human shields in this case would qualify as “screening.” However, the 
word “attack” causes some problems, as “attack” normally means an 
offensive movement.99 Thus, under most readings of EO 11850, use of 
RCAs would only be permitted in “defensive modes.”100 
The fundamental question under the CWC analysis is whether the 
combatant is using RCAs as a “method of warfare.” Understanding the 
plain meaning of “method of warfare,” the regular use of RCAs, even in 
defensive or life-saving postures, may suggest that they are being used as a 
“method” as opposed to simply a “means.”101 There is no exception in the 
CWC for use of RCAs as a less-damaging method of warfare. Thus, the 
CWC, even under the U.S. interpretation, would probably prohibit the use 
 
 97.  See Koplow, supra note 36, at 781-88 (relating the background of the British assault on 
Basra, upon which this hypothetical is based). 
 98.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-92, THE INFANTRY RECONNAISSANCE 
PLATOON AND SQUAD (AIRBORNE, AIR ASSAULT, LIGHT INFANTRY) paras. 5-2, 5-5 (1992) (describing 
how “screening” forces are used to protect a main force and provide advance information), available at 
http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/FM%207-92%20W%20CH%201.pdf. 
 99.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-21.8, INFANTRY RIFLE PLATOON AND 
SQUAD para. 7-10 (1992), available at https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/ 
public/23583-1/FM/3-21.8/chap7.htm#2 (“An attack is an offensive action characterized by movement 
supported by fire.”).  
 100.  See, e.g., OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 18. 
 101.  GUIDE TO LEGAL REVIEW, supra note 63, at 11.  
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of RCAs in this context. 
 b. LOAC 
LOAC principles lead to a very different conclusion than the CWC 
analysis. The RCAs here are deployed against combatants specifically to 
minimize damage to civilians, in an effort to abide by the principle of 
discrimination. The targets of this attack are the combatants, not the 
civilians, thus a proportionality analysis must be conducted. The damage to 
civilians in terms of collateral damage in using RCAs would be minimal, 
while the discrete and concrete military advantage—forcing the combatants 
into the open—is clear. Thus, the attack would be proportionate. When 
comparing the lethality rates of RCAs to the use of high explosives, for 
instance artillery, the balance clearly favors the RCAs, 0.5% to 20%.102 
Therefore, the attack would not cause unnecessary suffering. However, the 
commanders would have to be careful not to target combatants hors de 
combat, rendered so by the RCAs.103 Whether the fighters could be targeted 
after being driven out by the RCAs would depend on whether or not they 
give a clear sign of surrender.104 
B. Afghanistan 
1. Rioting in Kabul105 
An American mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle loses 
control and runs over twelve civilian vehicles. Some of the civilians are 
injured; others die. News of this traffic accident spreads quickly across the 
city and sparks widespread rioting. The protestors attack embassies and 
throw stones at U.S. troops. Afghan security forces are deployed to 
suppress the riot, but they are unable to control the crowds. The rioters 
begin to target aid organizations and government buildings. U.S. soldiers 
are called in to respond. Consistent with their Rules of Engagement (ROE), 
they demand that the crowd disperse and fire warning shots over the crowd, 
to no avail. Can they use RCAs? 
 
 102.  See supra notes 85-87. 
 103.  See GC IV, supra note 68, art. 3. A person hors de combat is generally a previously targetable 
combatant who has been rendered a “protected person” because he has been taken “out of combat” by 
some wound or surrender. OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 25, 75; see Fry, supra note 15, at 
537-38; see Fidler, Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 88, at 56. 
 104.  JAN RÖMER, KILLING IN A GRAY AREA BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
78 (2010). 
 105.  See Carlotta Gall, Convoy Crash Sparks Kabul Riots, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 29, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/29/world/asia/29iht-afghan.1843499.html (describing deadly riots in 
Kabul following a fatal traffic accident involving a NATO MRAP).  
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 a. CWC 
The CWC allows for the use of RCAs in “law enforcement.” There is 
no textual basis for concluding that this provision only includes domestic 
law enforcement. Here, the U.S. troops are arguably enforcing Afghan law 
and order. If their presence at the riot was requested by the Afghan 
government, they would be on strong legal ground. Additionally, since the 
rioters are not combatants, it would be unlikely to be interpreted as using 
RCAs as a “method of warfare.” How the U.S. forces could respond to the 
riot would arguably be governed by both LOAC and human rights 
principles if they are operating in a law enforcement capacity.106 However, 
even human rights law allows for the use of force in self-defense and to 
disperse riots, so long as that force is proportionate to the threat.107 In this 
situation, where the crowd has proved its hostile intent and has thrown 
rocks at U.S. forces, it would be proper, even if human rights law applied, 
for them to respond with RCAs.108 Of course, under an absolutist 
interpretation of the CWC, even this use of RCAs would be disallowed. 
 b. LOAC 
Under LOAC principles, one may not direct violence against civilians 
except in self-defense. There is no explicit allowance in the Geneva 
Conventions for any use of force, even non-lethal force, against civilians, 
unless they are directly participating in hostilities.109 However, the lex 
specialis principle may suggest that since Human Rights Law has the more 
specific provision regarding the use of force against civilians in a law 
enforcement setting, it should govern this situation.110 Further, state 
practice suggests that it is acceptable for military force operating in a law-
enforcement capacity to use non-lethal munitions and RCAs against 
civilians.111 For instance, RCAs were used in the peacekeeping missions in 
 
 106.  See U.N. HIGH COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT at 
131, U.N. Sales No. E.03.XIV.1 (2002), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training5Add2en.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT]. 
 107.  Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crimes and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Aug. 27 – Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officials, Principle 
9, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law 
/firearms.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 108.  Id. Principle 14. 
 109.  See GC IV, supra note 68, art. 27 (“Protected persons . . . shall be protected against all acts of 
violence”); AP I, supra note 45, art. 51.  
 110.  Karima Bennoune, Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 171, 225 (2004) (“The maxim lex specialis derogat generalis means broadly 
that a specific or special rule of international law is to take precedence over a general rule.”). 
 111.  The Spetsnaz’s use of a fentanyl incapacitant in the Moscow standoff would be a prime 
example of such state practice. See, e.g., Fidler, Incapacitating CBW, supra note 39, at 175.  
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both Yugoslavia and Liberia.112 Thus, since the civilians have used 
violence against the security forces and U.S. troops, they would be justified 
in responding with proportionate violence.113 Further, RCAs may be the 
least harmful option available to the U.S. forces. Even other NLW, such as 
“rubber bullets,” are far more likely to cause injury or death than RCAs.114 
Thus, the use of RCAs avoids superfluous injury and unnecessary 
suffering. RCAs would therefore be permitted under a simple LOAC 
review. 
2. Cave Combat 
Intelligence reports indicate that some high-level Taliban fighters have 
fled into the caves of southern Afghanistan. The caves are heavily fortified 
and any raid by ground troops would lead to unacceptable casualties. There 
is evidence to suggest that they are looking to fight to the death and will 
refuse calls for surrender. The commander’s Staff Judge Advocate advises 
him that use of a themobaric weapon would be legal. A thermobaric bomb 
would explode near the mouth of the cave and create a huge fireball.115 The 
change in pressure and oxygen caused by the fireball would suffocate and 
kill nearly everyone in the cave.116 Can the U.S. launch RCAs into the cave 
to drive them out? 
 a. CWC 
The CWC would forbid the use of RCAs in this situation. The use of 
RCAs against combatants in order to more effectively target them would 
not be consistent with the method of warfare restriction. The use of RCAs 
as a method of cave combat dates back to the Vietnam war, when U.S. 
forces used RCAs to drive the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army out 
of their tunnels. In cave combat, the RCAs would arguably both be the 
means and the method of warfare. This use of RCAs would even be 
disallowed under EO 11850. Since there are no human shields involved, 
and none of the other three conditions of EO 11850 are met, the use of 
RCAs would be strictly prohibited. Further, state practice indicates this use 
 
 112.  Fry, supra note 15, at 487, 492. 
 113.  See HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 106, at 122. 
 114.  Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, Israeli Doctors Warn Against Rubber Bullets, 324 BRITISH MED. J. 
1296-97 (2002). 
 115.  See BLU-118/ B Thermobaric Weapons, GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/systems/munitions/blu-118.htm (last visited May 6, 2011); Pentagon to Use New Bomb on 
Afghan Caves, CNN NEWS (December 22, 2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-12-22/us/ret.new. 
weapon_1_caves-and-tunnels-thermobaric-fuel-air?_s=PM:US.  
 116.  See Noah Schachtman, When a Gun Is More than a Gun, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2003), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/03/58094. 
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would be disallowed. In the 1999 fighting in Chechnya, for instance, 
Russian forces used thermobaric weapons because the use of chemical 
munitions was forbidden.117 
 b. LOAC 
Under the LOAC principles, this use of RCAs would be permitted. 
There are no civilians present and the combat is not likely to result in any 
damage to civilian lives or property. Thus, there is no distinction problem. 
Under proportionality, there is no civilian cost, so the use of RCAs would 
be proportionate to the military necessity. Further, RCAs may be the most 
humane option available. If the best alternative weapon system is a 
thermobaric bomb, discussed above, then RCAs look extremely humane by 
contrast. The use of an RCA in a cave would likely lead to higher lethality 
and greater injury than using an RCA in the open would, as the toxic 
concentration would be higher.118 However, even this appears to be more 
humane that the thermobaric option. Thus, the U.S. could use the RCAs in 
this context under the basic LOAC principles. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
Using solely the methods-based LOAC framework leads to far fewer 
restrictions on the use of RCAs than the CWC imposes. The most 
prominent difference in the use of RCAs is in the targeting of combatants, 
especially as a force multiplier and in the cave context. However, given the 
unique context and history of chemical weapons, substantially modifying 
or withdrawing from the CWC regime in order to more fully use RCAs 
would not be in the interest of the United States. 
RCAs and other NLW give commanders a spectrum of force 
options.119 In the case of the Afghan rioters, rather than having to fire over 
the heads of the crowd in Kabul, they could have relied on RCAs to 
disperse the crowd. Forbidding the use of RCAs in these contexts gives the 
commander the option of firing into the crowd or retreating. It is hard to 
dispute that RCAs and NLW more broadly provide a middle ground. Yet, 
the CWC would, in a theatre of armed conflict, prohibit such a use (if one 
adopts the majority understanding). The U.S. understanding, however, 
 
 117.  Fuel-Air Explosives, GLOBALSECURITY, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions 
/fae.htm (last visited May 6, 2011). 
 118.  Koplow, supra note 36, at 762 (describing the questionable safety of CS gas when used in 
confined spaces).  
 119.  James C. Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 
1, 34 (1998).  
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would permit the use of RCAs in this fashion.120 Therefore, the U.S. 
understanding of RCAs as relates to EO 11850 may be the more “humane” 
interpretation. Further, this example demonstrates the limitations of using a 
“means of warfare” approach, which focuses on the technology used, rather 
than the method by which it is employed. 
Arms control “treaties often provide a false sense of security and can 
prevent prudent research” into more effective weapons systems.121 The use 
of basic principles or “methods” approach allows a much greater flexibility 
than a technology specific convention. Rather than focusing on the 
technology, focusing on the methods by which weapons could be used 
would allow legal advisers to always keep in mind the ultimate objective of 
LOAC—to reduce unnecessary human suffering in war. For instance, if 
there were a new chemical incapacitant which had a lethality rate under 
about 10%, would it not be preferable in humanitarian terms to traditional 
high explosive munitions? To be sure, there are some severe risks with this 
system. As the Russian opera house siege makes clear, just because 
someone is incapacitated does not mean that they will be spared from 
kinetic targeting.122 There is no guarantee that even the best NLW available 
would be used in a non-lethal manner. However, like any other weapon 
system, NLW would be subject to the existing methods of warfare 
restrictions.123 
Additionally, the weakness of the methods approach is that while the 
CWC has one or two points of ambiguity, the entire LOAC analysis is 
fraught with ambiguous terms. Its flexibility is therefore both its greatest 
strength and its greatest weakness. Unlike interpretations of the CWC, 
however, there is a great deal of state practice upon which one can base 
interpretations of the LOAC principles.124 Additionally, with the creation of 
the ICC and the case law from the ad hoc tribunals, there has been and will 
likely continue to be a great deal of persuasive interpretations of the LOAC 
principles.125 
 
 120.  See EO 11,850, supra note 53.  
 121.  Alexander, supra note 4, at 67. 
 122.  See David P. Fidler, The Meaning of Moscow: “Non-lethal” Weapons and International Law 
in the 21st Century, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 525, 533 (Sept. 2005).  
 123.  Id. at 530-31.  
 124.  Compare Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 75. Riot Control Agents, 
ICRC: CUSTOMARY IHL, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule75 (last visited May 
8, 2011), with Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 47. Attacks Against Persons 
Hors de Combat, ICRC: CUSTOMARY IHL, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule47 
(last visited May 8, 2011).  
 125.  See, e.g., Practice Relating to Rule 47, supra note 124 (discussing international criminal 
tribunals and their impact on customary international humanitarian law).  
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A possible objection to the methods system would be that the major 
innovation of the CWC was its monitoring and compliance mechanisms. 
Unlike the CWC, there is no accountability or monitoring mechanism for 
the LOAC reviews. Yet, even the CWC is ultimately a voluntary body of 
law.126 It depends on the cooperation and the consent of the States Parties 
to make it function. Nothing guarantees that states will follow arms control 
treaties with specific provisions more than they would the broad LOAC 
principles. There have been several prominent examples of arms control 
treaties being immediately and secretly undermined by the States Parties. 
For instance, almost immediately following the signing of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the USSR began the most extensive bioweapon 
program to date.127 
In some instances, being able to use RCA in a theatre of war may be 
both more humane and more effective than the use of other weapons. 
However, the U.S. should not withdraw from the CWC regime. Given the 
history of CW, including their history of misuse, withdrawing from the 
CWC would risk hindering our ability to work in military coalitions. 
Further, withdrawing from the CWC would forever link future systems, 
including non-lethal weapons, to the horrors of chemical weapons and 
thereby impair their legitimacy.128 
Nevertheless, the example of non-lethal CW shows the limits of 
positive international law in the context of arms control. This example has 
particular relevance looking forward as new weapons systems, from 
unmanned vehicles to directed energy weapons, come online.129 For these 
new weapons systems, the existing regulations on the methods of warfare 
will govern.130 The ICJ had the opportunity to consider such a situation in 
the court’s advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons.131 In that 
case, the question presented to the court was whether nuclear weapons 
could ever be used in a manner consistent with international law.132 The 
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court responded that it would generally be illegal to use nuclear weapons, 
except in the most extreme circumstances of self-defense.133 The court, 
lacking existing positive law, relied heavily on basic principles of LOAC 
and a methods-based approach to this means-related question.134 The ICJ 
implicitly recognized that positive international law, such as it is, will 
always lag developments in technology.135 Standards of humanity and 
public conscience, as highlighted in the Martens Clause, on the other hand, 
can be applied to every new iteration of military technology.136 The ICJ 
opined that this clause “has proved to be an effective means of addressing 
the rapid evolution of military technology.”137 
Indeed, the Martens Clause is effective as a means to address the rapid 
evolution of technology precisely because, unlike the CWC, it establishes 
standards, not rules.138 The standards set by LOAC principles can likely 
achieve their objectives as well or better than a CWC-style regime of 
means-based rules. The rules of the CWC, as this note has demonstrated, 
end up forbidding the use of potentially more humane weapons out of a 
fear of going down a slippery slope. Chemical weapons are indeed a 
uniquely dangerous means of warfare. Mustard gas and aerosolized nerve 
agents can strike fear into the heart of every combatant and civilian in an 
especially powerful way.139 They have been used to intentionally kill and 
disfigure civilian populations.140 However, the fact that these weapons can 
be and have been abused does not necessarily mean that a blanket ban on 
such weapons best achieves the humanitarian goals of LOAC. 
How then can communities concerned with arms control respond? The 
solution is not to completely abandon arms control treaties or LOAC rules. 
Rather, the solution going forward is two-fold: (1) ensure future arms 
treaties focus on the methods of warfare—how should this new weapon 
system be used—rather than the means of warfare themselves, and (2) 
bolster internal legal reviews for new weapons systems. 
 
 133.  Id. para. 105.  
 134.  See id. para. 78 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  Id. para. 86 (explaining that the basic principles of LOAC “appl[y] to all forms of warfare and 
to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future.”) 
 137.  Id. para. 78.  
 138.  The use of standards to deal with changing technological realities has often been recognized 
as superior to a rules-based approach in other contexts. See, e.g., Derek Bambauer, Rules, Standards 
and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49, 52 (2010); Paul Otto, Note, Reasonableness Meets 
Requirements: Regulating Security and Privacy in Software, 59 DUKE L.J. 309, 337 (2009). 
 139.  See Forster, supra note 1. 
 140.  See generally Gwynne Roberts, Poisonous Weapons, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE 
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW (Roy Gutman et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-
guide/poisonous-weapons-2/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
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The rationale behind recent arms control treaties, such as the Protocol 
on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, is the effect of these weapons on civilians.141 Current arms 
control regimes, however, focus on the nature of the weapons. A methods 
approach to arms control would focus combatants and their legal advisors 
on the fundamental principles of LOAC, such as the minimization of 
unnecessary human suffering. Combatants intent on violating LOAC can 
inflict massive amounts of harm on civilian populations without advanced 
weapons.142 Indeed, some of the most truly horrific abuses in war are 
committed with no weapons at all.143 Those combatants who value LOAC 
and take its provisions seriously, on the other hand, find themselves forced 
to choose a more damaging tactic, such as dropping a fuel-air bomb, when 
precluded from using more effective and potentially less harmful means. 
An important part of a “methods” approach would be for the U.S. to 
champion an agreement which sets international standards for the legal 
review of new weapons systems. Articles 35 and 36 of Additional Protocol 
1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (AP1) set out some basic standards for a 
legal review of weapons systems. However, “only a limited number of 
States[, such as the U.S.,] are known to have put in place mechanisms or 
procedures to conduct legal reviews.”144 The U.S. legal reviews look at the 
principles of LOAC and at their most likely methods of employment.145 
The ICRC has produced a guide which may be a model for such 
reviews. The ICRC’s Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means 
and Methods of Warfare provides certain guidelines for implementing 
Article 36 of AP1. They suggest looking, in addition to treaty law, to 
considerations of “public conscience” and the principles of humanity (i.e., 
the LOAC principles). The ICRC points specifically to the Martens Clause 
in Article 1(2) of AP1, which states that those areas which fall outside of 
the existing legal regime “remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”146By 
standardizing international legal reviews, the humanitarian community may 
be able to more fully integrate the humanitarian principles that define the 
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LOAC into the development and deployment of all new weapons systems. 
Additionally, non-legal considerations will always restrict what 
weapons a commander can and would choose to use. Any use of a 
“cowardly,” over-destructive or indiscriminate weapon will likely be 
noticed and publicized. This publicity will undoubtedly affect public 
opinion both in the population within which one is fighting and domestic 
public opinion. This “lawfare” effect with regard to chemical weapons can 
be seen as far back as World War I.147 Indeed, this effect can be quite long-
lasting. For instance, the use of chemical weapons like Agent Orange 
during the Vietnam War has continued to affect U.S. international relations 
many decades later.148 In WWI, the German decision to use toxic gas 
undoubtedly contributed to the Allies’ narrative of the German nation as 
one of barbarians who use such horrible weapons.149 Further, working in a 
coalition effectively limits the types of weapons a country can use. For 
instance, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, though the President had authorized 
the use of RCAs, the use of RCAs in a coalition operation with almost any 
of our partners would have been inhibited by their legal obligations.150 
In modern conflicts, especially counterinsurgency and military 
operations other than war, the perception of illegality or immorality can 
prevent the warfighters from achieving their strategic objectives.151 
Therefore, even the perception of illegality can be effective at inhibiting the 
use of certain weapons systems in modern warfare.152 Even if a given 
weapon has certain tactical advantages, lawfare and political realities may 
help prevent their use. In this way, concepts like lawfare may help fill the 
gaps in a methods-based approach to arms control. 
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CONCLUSION 
RCAs have been an element of war since that French policeman first 
brought chloroacetophenone, CN gas, to the Western Front. The 
international community has responded to the horrors witnessed in war in 
two principal ways: by technology-specific treaties and by principles which 
govern the ever changing battlefield. The technology-specific treaties may 
have had an important role to play in creating and reinforcing norms 
against the use of certain weapons that the majority of the human race 
considers immoral. However, they often fail to keep pace with technology. 
The development and advancement of non-lethal RCAs demonstrates the 
weakness of such a regime and that it can inhibit the use of certain 
technologies which could help minimize unnecessary human suffering in 
war. As the ICJ noted in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, principles of 
humanity and the basic principles of LOAC are best situated to keep pace 
with technology.153 
The principles-based method approach to questions of arms control 
has one indelible benefit over means-based treaties: it is timeless. Methods 
standards apply to a bow and arrow the same as they do to a Tomahawk 
missile. They also direct the analysis immediately to the concern of 
LOAC—the minimization of human suffering in war. Perhaps looking to 
the future, a re-emphasis of the basic principles of LOAC, either in policy 
statements or a new international agreement, would be preferable to a new 
arms control treaty. To the extent new technologies threaten to stretch 
existing LOAC principles, new treaties should consider the most humane 
rules governing their method of use, rather than banning the means itself. 
To demonstrate its dedication to such principles, the U.S. may want to push 
for a new agreement which expands on AP1, Art. 36 and mandates that all 
nations undertake legal reviews of their weapons system. Such internal 
reviews may lead to greater internalization of these most important 
principles of LOAC and thereby promote the ultimate goal of all LOAC—
to minimize unnecessary human suffering in war. 
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